IT is plain that there is not the same degree of commitment from political parties for electoral reforms ; it is also clear that some will scupper any initiative to change the current voting formula. While their views should be respected, it is naive to depend on them to reform the electoral system. Inspite of their political differences, the LP and the MMM have shown a keen interest to do away with the unfairness and the defects of the current FPTP voting formula. They have discussed and negotiated on many facets of the reform and have reached agreement on several items. They also have the required majority in Parliament to enact the legislative changes to carry out electoral reform. Such a prospect has very rarely arisen in our political history.

Now is the moment to seize this window of opportunity to iron out the remaining differences between them and move the process forward. Hence the necessity for the White Paper to help rather than to hinder the reform process. While the intention of having a White Paper may be right, there is nevertheless the high risks of collateral damages and unintended consequences. This could easily happen if the White Paper simply catalogues the various options available (there could be as many as there are shapes, sizes and flavours of ice cream) without making a case for the desired one. Equally it could open the wrong debate. For instance, whatever the merit of reconsidering constituency size, it would not serve the cause of reform if the White Paper were to recommend a review of constituencies so as to bring them closer in terms of the number of voters.

The White Paper can help if it makes the distinction among issues where there is explicit agreement between the two major parties, those where implicit consensus seem to prevail, the items that are necessary for reform to work and need to be agreed upon as they have not been thrashed out and those where more work is required to inform the debate and the decision making process. These are listed below in four categories and it provides a framework for a meaningful and relevant White Paper.

1. Areas where there appears to be explicit agreement

i) to move from the current FPTP system to a mixed FPTP/ PR voting formula. To open the debate by considering other formulae - pure PR formula of Carcassonne or two member FPTP constituency as suggested by the British experts - will only complicate matters. We need reform, not revolution ; tranquil efficacy not vengeful upheaval ; ii) to keep the 20 three-member and one two-member constituencies (Rodrigues) using the FPTP mode. The formula has delivered on many of the core values of a good electoral system and should be maintained ; iii) to retain the boundaries of the 20 existing constituencies. It is a necessary compromise to reassure some segments of society, to allow the new electoral system to settle down and to prevent the reform from being hijacked by other considerations ; iv) to allot the new PR seats on a national party list basis ; v) to return PR MPs through a closed, rank-based party list. Parties should constitute their national list in terms of numbers and rank ; vi) to provide for the national PR party lists to be submitted to the Electoral Commissioner and published before elections ;

2. Areas where there seems to be implicit agreement

i) to ensure gender fairness in the electoral system. While everybody extols the virtues of greater women representation, there is no explicit agreement on how the two parties propose to do it. The devil might be in the details. I have made some specific proposals in the 2012 report on a minimum of 33 % Parliamentary representation covering both constituencies and Party list. However there may be other formulae that would enhance female representation without going to the extent suggested in that document ; ii) to allow double candidacies where some candidates will appear both on the Party list and will compete in FPTP constituency elections. It will give an additional protection to some ‘minority’ candidates who may not be elected in their constituencies whilst their running mates get through. However the system applies for all candidates ; iii) to introduce a minimum threshold of 10 % of national vote for parties to be eligible for the PR party list seats. Whilst it may not be fair to small parties, it is probably the price to avoid a political fragmentation on communal or religious lines and an exacerbation of identity politics ;

can easily be reached

i) to agree on the number of PR seats to complement the 62 FPTP MPs. 20 PR seats should do the job. However there could be some few more (2 to 4) to give additional comfort for the subsumption of the BLS into the new formula ; this will also determine the size of the National Assembly (between 82 and 86 Mps) ; ii) to finalise the method of allocating the PR seats. The parallel PR mode is unfair and unrepresentative as it may lead to huge disparities between overall votes and total seats. It is the main reason why it was rejected by Sachs. The compensatory mode of allocating PR seats converts the electoral system into a proportional one. The maximisation of proportionality is not always a desirable end. If we want to preserve stability which is a fundamental feature of an electoral system, we should avoid pure PR and choose broad proportionality instead. In some instances, pure PR would make it very difficult to have a clear majority to govern the country. I have suggested a hybrid formula between the two as a compromise. It is not perfect but it has the merit of being better than the parallel mode in terms of fairness and superior to the compensatory mode on stability. If it appears too cumbersome and there is consensus between the two major parties on the compensatory formula, then they should embrace it while being cognisant of the risks for stability ; iii) to use the d’Hondt highest average formula to allocate the PR seats among eligible parties. This is the system used in many democracies and also the one that exists in Rodrigues ; iv) to decide on whether to have one set (to be used for both FPTP and PR seats) or two sets of vote (one set for FPTP and a second one for PR seats) ; v) to determine whether there will be two separate ballot papers in case there are two ‘sets’ of votes ; vi) to adjust the percentage of votes before alloting the PR seats by excluding parties that have not reached the eligibility threshold and recomputing the percentage of eligible parties’ votes. This is required to apportion all PR seats ; vii) to appoint the next person on the party list to Parliament in case of a vacancy for PR MPs. As these MPs are returned on the basis of votes polled by their respective parties, there will be no bye-elections. However bye-elections will remain to replace FPTP MPs as they are elected ‘nominally’ and not by Party list ; viii) to replace party list MPs in case of crossing of the fl oor ; however such provision shall not apply to constituency MPs. He/She will retain the seat until the next election ;

4. Areas where additional work is required

i) to agree on the best alternative to replace the BLS mechanism. The existing electoral system contains four special characteristics to guarantee the political representation of all the main segments of the population. These are specially drawn constituencies, unequal electoral districts, three-member constituencies and the Best Loser System (BLS). It is plain that with the UN pronouncement and the rejection by the two main political parties of the proposal to update the 1972 community-based population census, ethnic balance in Parliament cannot be underpinned by Constitutional design. It has to be driven by parties’ natural strategies and their continued imperative to play the ‘balancing game’. I have proposed that the objective of the BLS be subsumed into a new mixed FPTP and Party List electoral system through two sets of measures. First is the retention of three-member constituencies, coupled with the maintenance of electoral boundaries and the acceptance of unequal distribution of voters across constituencies. Second is the addition of 20 PR MPs returned on a closed, ranked-based Party list and the provision for double candidacies. Together, these six measures will ensure socio-demographic inclusion whilst removing the communal masonry from our Constitution. It is a win-win situation and it also constitutes an effective and enforceable remedy to the violation of rights established by the UN Human Rights Commission. If there are better alternatives to the above proposal, then they should be considered. The White Paper will certainly help reform if it i) acknowledges the considerable amount of work accomplished since 2001 on electoral reform ; ii) confirms the retention of the FPTP formula within a mixed electoral system ; iii) provides pathways to cure the four defects of the FPTP formula ; iv) spells out areas where there is already explicit agreement between the two main parties ; v) helps in finalizing issues where there seems to be an implicit understanding between them ; vi) assists in resolving some outstanding issues that should not pose much difficulties ; vii) makes specific proposals, if any, to replace the BLS mechanism that are considered better than those that are already on the table ; viii) suggests ways of ensuring that the electoral system is consistent with the UN recommendation of a non-communal electoral system ; ix) proposes a draft text, after discussion between the two main parties on some of the aforementioned issues, that includes the principal elements constituting the proposed electoral reform. A failure to recognize the progress made since 2001, an inclination to start afresh with new proposals, a temptation to simply provide various alternatives without making an informed choice and a propensity to have an academic/ theoretical debate on the issue would certainly hinder electoral reform and/or delay its realisation. Never has the country been so close to reaching an agreement among the main political parties on reforming the electoral rules. One can only hope that the White Paper will rise to the challenge and build on that momentum to accelerate the process. In short, it will be a boon !

THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM CONTAINS FOUR SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS TO GUARANTEE THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF ALL THE MAIN SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION.